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Some recent contributions to the understanding of the eects of international trade upon
labour markets have focused on the role of exports on wages (Schank et al. 2007, Munch &
Skaksen 2008, Frias et al. 2009). Such emphasis on exports in these worker-level studies is
warranted by new ndings on the importance of rm heterogeneity in exports (Bernard &
Bradford Jensen 1999, Melitz 2003, Bernard & Jensen 2004, Bernard et al. 2007) and also by
ongoing research on the productivity eects of exporting (Clerides et al. 1998, Van Biesebroeck
2005, De Loecker 2007).
However, a deeper understanding of the eects of international trade upon labour mar-
kets requires the concurrent consideration of imports, the twin ow of exports. Indeed, this
dimension of international trade - imports - has been conspicuously absent in the micro-
level trade-and-labour literature, when one takes into account its huge potential impact as
suggested by the following:
 Imports may matter more than exports in terms of their scope to aect welfare. As
Krugman (1994) put it, `[T]he purpose of international trade - the reason it is useful - is
to import, not to export. That is, what a country really gains from trade is the ability
to import things it wants. Exports are not an objective in and of themselves.' Moreover,
as the magnitude of imports is approximately equal to that of exports, imports clearly
have a signicant potential in terms of labour-market eects.
 Imports from developing countries have been regarded as a potentially major force
driving the rising wage inequality observed in the U.S. and other countries (Freeman
(1995) reviews this literature). This view stemmed from the factor price equalisation
result in international trade theory and the still large wage dierences between developed
and developing countries. Moreover, a recent literature has focused on the eects of
outsourcing and oshoring (Kramarz 2008, Hummels et al. 2009), two forces which can
be important components of rm-level imports. Their emergence in the last decade
has prompted concerns that the previous consensus of a relatively unimportant eect of
international trade (and imports in particular) on wages may not longer apply (Krugman
2008).
 The export status of a rm is a good predictor of its import status (Bernard & Schott
22009), implying that rm- or worker-level studies of the link between exports and wages
that do not control for imports (Schank et al. 2007, Munch & Skaksen 2008, Frias et al.
2009) may over- or underestimate the impact of exports. This missing-variable bias may
also play some role in explaining the contrasting results of these studies.1
 Finally, imports have recently been shown to generate important productivity eects,
through channels involving learning, variety or quality aspects (Amiti & Konings 2007,
Goldberg et al. 2008, Halpern et al. 2009). In this context, it is possible that the
increased prots resulting from the purchase of higher-quality intermediate inputs from
foreign manufacturers be eventually shared with the rm's workers in terms of wages
that exceed those workers' outside options. Such rent sharing would conceivably occur
in labour markets that exhibit non-competitive features.2
Our paper seeks to ll this considerable gap in the literature regarding the role of imports
in wage determination. Specically, this paper is the rst that contrasts the roles of exports
and imports in terms of rm- or worker-level wages. We implement our analysis drawing
on rich matched rm-worker longitudinal data which we merge with rich rm-transaction
longitudinal data - the latter including information on both exports and imports. This new
data set follows the population of rms in a medium-sized open economy, Portugal, including
all workers and all international trade transactions of each rm on an annual basis over a long
period (1995 to 2005).
The richness of the data allows us to control for many confounding factors by estimating
dierent econometric specications, including worker and rm xed eects or job spell xed
eects. In the latter specications we rely on longitudinal variation in trade status or trade
intensity in each rm to identify the eects of these variables on wages. This method ensures
we are controlling for all (observed and unobserved) time-invariant factors that may be cor-
related with trade while also aecting wages. In addition, as the period covered by our data
is centered at the introduction of the euro, it could be argued that our rms were exposed, at
least in part, to an exogenous shock in terms of lower international transaction costs.
1Schank et al. (2007) and Munch & Skaksen (2008) study the cases of Germany and Denmark, respectively,
and nd small or zero eects of exports, while Frias et al. (2009) studies the case of Mexico and nds large
and signicant eects.
2Overall, we believe this asymmetric treatment of exports and imports in the recent research results mainly
from greater availability of exports data. Another factor that may play a role is that policy makers tend to be
more interested in the eects of exports, even though, as mentioned in the Paul Krugman quote above, in a
macroeconomic sense, exports are only of interest to the extent that they facilitate imports.
3Moreover, in a second contribution made in this paper, we test the implicit assumption
from previous studies that all exports are the same in terms of their eects on wages, regardless
of the type of products being sold. We also extend this analysis to the case of imports. The
study of possible dierences in the eects across product types is particularly useful as it
can shed light on dierent (competitive or non-competitive) theoretical explanations for wage
dierentials amongst rms with dierent international trade statuses.
Our empirical results support the motivation of our analysis as we nd that rm-level im-
ports actually tend to be a determinant of wages as important as rm-level exports. Moreover,
we also nd that rms that increase their exports of high-technology products or that increase
their imports of intermediate-technology products tend to increase their salaries, even after
controlling for several other wage determinants.
The remaining of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the main theoretical aspects
of our analysis and some of the related literature, Sections 3 and 4 present the two data sets
used and several descriptive statistics, Sections 5 and 6 present our results and, nally, Section
7 concludes.
2 Theoretical discussion
There are two main theoretical views one can appeal to in order to interpret any wage dier-
ences, in particular those among exporters, importers and non-traders which we study in this
paper. In the rst case, competitive views of the labour market would regard any wage pre-
miums as a reection of worker (unobserved) quality. For instance, econometric studies may
draw on less information on workers than that available to employers when hiring, retaining
or dismissing employees. In this case the wage premiums could correspond to systematic dif-
ferences between the workforces in dierent types of rms and not to wages above the outside
options of workers.
Similarly, wage dierences could correspond to compensating dierentials, for instance if
the working conditions of rms that trade were disadvantageous compared to those of rms
that do not trade. As an example, international traders may be subject to greater risk in terms
of customer orders or production conditions, in which case workers would demand premiums.
Alternatively, international traders may be able to achieve less risk through international
diversication in their input and/or output markets, in which case workers would be willing
4to be paid less.
A second main theoretical view involves non-competitive mechanisms in the labour market.
These typically evolve from search frictions or informational imperfections, for instance in
terms of the matching between job-seekers and vacancies or in terms of the monitoring of
worker eort. In the case of eciency wages, rms that trade may require higher eort from
their workers (see Verhoogen (2008) for the case of exporters). One example would be if
consumers in destination countries value quality more than in the origin country. Firms that
wish to export will then have to adjust the quality of their product mix and to motivate
workers to exert more eort - for instance through wages that are suciently higher than the
worker's best alternative.3
An alternative non-competitive mechanism that would generate a wage premium is rent
sharing. In an important contribution, Kramarz (2008) emphasizes that importing can af-
fect wages both because it changes the overall quasi-rent but also because it can aect the
rms and the workers threat points when bargaining. There are a number of reasons why
these threat points may change: for instance, imports of intermediate products may provide
workers with hold-up opportunities when the rm has to purchase these inputs in advance.
This might explain why importers pay more than non-importers (including exporters-only).
However, imports of nished goods by the rm or by its competitors may weaken the employ-
ees' bargaining position if these imports result in a decrease of the workers' outside oers.
Moreover, exporters may also need to make specic investments that would generate hold-up
opportunities for their workers.4
A related point is that rms that trade may face dierent elasticities of demand of the
products they sell. In particular, the elasticity of demand with respect to the product price
may be higher for exporters than for non-exporters to the extent that the international market
is more competitive than the domestic market. In this case, as indicated by Marshall's rules,
exporters will be less prone to concede wage premia than importers.
In our view, the non-competitive models have a strong potential explanatory power given
3Moreover, rms that want to export might need to update their equipment and import better machines
from abroad (Iacovone & Javorcik (2008) show that the introduction of new export products tends to be
preceded by investment in physical assets and technology acquisition). These rms might pay workers even
more because the marginal benet of convincing workers to exert more eort is higher due to the interaction
of workers' eort with better machines.
4See also Amiti & Davis (2008) who consider a model with fair wages, another non-competitive mechanism,
where wages in the rm are proportional to rm's prots and not necessarily equal to the worker's outside
option; and Davidson et al. (2008).
5the evidence that exporters are more productive than rms that sell only on the domestic
market.5 In this case, exporters gain higher prots than non-exporters and might pass on
some of those gains to their workers through some form of rent sharing.
Moreover, recent research on the productivity eects from international trade is placing
emphasis on the role of importing too. To begin with, exporters are frequently importers as
well (Bernard & Schott 2009), in which case part of the productivity advantage of exporters
can be due to their sourcing inputs from foreign markets (Altomonte & Bekes 2009). In
any case, either that of importers only or exporter-importers, access to cheaper imported
inputs can again raise productivity via learning, variety, and quality eects (Amiti & Konings
2007, Kasahara & Rodrigue 2008, Goldberg et al. 2008, Halpern et al. 2009). Importers
arguably have greater choice in the sourcing of their inputs and can exploit any gaps between
international and national prices, resulting in productivity or cost-eciency dierences.
Having reviewed the explanations above for either true or spurious wage premiums among
importers and exporters when compared to non-traders, we underline that most if not all
arguments apply equally to importers and exporters. However, the intensity of any worker
heterogeneity or productivity eects may still vary depending on the specic trade status of
the rm. In particular, importing and exporting may enhance a rm's protability dierently,
particularly when products of dierent technological level are being transacted.
3 The QP/INE data
The data used in this paper are obtained from merging two major data sets: the INE trade
data and the QP labour data. The INE trade data includes all export and import transactions
by rms that are located in Portugal, on a monthly basis. These data are derived from customs
returns forms in the case of extra-EU trade and from a special form supplied to the Portuguese
statistics agency, INE - Instituto Nacional de Estat stica (Intrastat) in the case of intra-EU
trade. Overall, the data amount to the ocial total exports and imports of Portugal.
Each transaction record includes the rms tax identication, an eight-digit Combined
Nomenclature product code, the value of the transaction, the quantity of transacted goods,
the destination/origin country, the relevant international commercial term, etc. We were able
5Some research has argued that exporters are ex-ante more ecient and, as such, are able to sustain xed
and variable trade costs and self-select into export markets (Clerides et al. 1998). Other studies have shown
that, on top of self-selection, exporters might become more productive because they learn from exporting
(Van Biesebroeck 2005), especially when goods are sold to high-income countries (De Loecker 2007).
6to gain access for the purposes of this research to data from 1995 to 2005.
The second main data source is Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset matching
rms and workers based in Portugal. The data are made available by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Security, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all rms in Portugal that em-
ploy at least one worker. The data also cover individual information on all personnel working
for each rm in a reference month (October), except for 2001. The variables available in the
data set include the rm's location, industry, total employment, sales, ownership structure,
and legal setting. At the worker's level, the data set includes information on gender, age,
occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings (ve dierent variables), duration of work, etc.
Each rm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number
which we use to follow rms over time. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identier,
based on the worker's social security number, which we also use to follow individuals over
time.
Finally, we merged the two data sets using the rm identiers and rm characteristics
made available in each data set. Given the predominance of manufacturing in international
trade, we excluded from our analysis non-manufacturing sector rms. (See the data appendix
for more details on the two data sets.)
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents aggregate descriptive statistics, on a year-by-year basis, based on the resulting
data set. We nd that the total number of rms (traders and non-traders) increases from
32,601 in 1995 to 39,071 in 2005, while the total number of employees falls from 817k in 1995
to 736k in 2005. The latter development most likely reects the increasing size of the services
sector in Portugal as in most other developed economies.
More interestingly given our goals in this paper, the number of exporter-importers (exporters-
only; importers-only) increases from 3056 (2104; 2015) in 1995 to 3725 (2538; 2154) in 2005.
In terms of sales, there is also an increasing trend over time: by 2005, exports correspond
to approximately 30% of total sales of the manufacturing sector, while imports correspond
to about 25% of the same total sales. Overall, these statistics highlight the openness of the
Portuguese economy, which has been a member of the European Union since 1986. Moreover,
the greater percentages of exports and imports in terms of sales than in terms of number of
7rms is consistent with abundant evidence from other countries indicating that rms that
trade are bigger than those that do not.
The special characteristics of traders can be discerned more clearly from Table 2, which
presents several rm-level statistics, by international trade type (no trade, exporters-only,
importers-only and exporters-importers), from pooled 1995-2005 data. As expected from the
previous analysis, mean sales are much higher in the cases of traders than non-traders (1.2m
euros or more vs 0.38m); moreover, sales of rms that both import and export are even higher,
at more than 12m euros. Mean rm size (in terms of number of workers) is again much higher
in the case of traders (25 or more employees vs only 10), although less than proportionately
in terms of the sales gap, suggesting greater productivity amongst traders.
Table 2 also presents dierent statistics concerning worker characteristics (rst computed
at the rm-year level and then averaged across rms and years). There are not major dif-
ferences across rm types in terms of schooling or experience; however, rms that trade (in
particular, rms that export) tend to exhibit a more feminine workforce and much higher
levels of tenure. Furthermore, of particular interest for our study, we nd that hourly wages
are considerably higher at rms that trade than in rms that only sell at the domestic market:
in the latter case the average real hourly wage is 3.12 euros per hour, while exporters-only
(importers-only) pay 3.61 (4.43) and exporter-importers pay 4.67 euros per hour. Similar
comparisons arise from the analysis of medians instead of means.
In addition, Table 2 presents descriptive information on the export and import shares (in
terms of total sales) of each type of trader. We nd that, on average, exporters-only sell
30% of their sales to foreign markets, while in the case of importers-only their international
transactions correspond to 24% of their sales. For exporter-importers, the export and import
shares are, respectively, 37% and 22%. There is also evidence of skewness, as the median
share is always smaller than the mean share.
Furthermore, we nd from Figures 1 and 2 that there is a positive relationship between
wages and exports and, in particular, imports, not only when considering the discrete measures
of trade above but also when considering trade intensity: The slope of the tted line of a simple
bivariate regression of log wages on export (import) shares is .256 (.862), with a standard error
of .011 (.017).
Finally, Table 3 presents worker-level descriptive statistics, again broken down by the
8international trade type of each worker's rm (no trade, exporters-only, importers-only and
exporters-importers). This analysis addresses possible composition bias resulting from rm-
level averaging. However, we nd that the rankings of the four types of rms across the
dierent variables is typically unchanged. More importantly, we nd again that workers em-
ployed in rms that trade are paid higher real hourly wages than their counterparts employed
in rms that do not engage in international trade. Interestingly, we nd again that the wage
premium appears to be higher in the case of rms that only import than in the case of rms
that only export (5.01 vs 3.66 euros per hour). Table 3 also makes clear the potential economy-
level eects from the wage practices of rms that trade as they account for a large proportion
of the manufacturing workforce: more than 4m workers-year were employed by rms that
export and/or import, compared to less than 2m in the case of manufacturing-sector rms
that do not trade.
4 Trade dynamics
As mentioned in the introduction, our analysis of the relationship between trade status and
wages is based to a large extent on the variation over time of the rm's international trade.
In this context, it is important to ascertain the actual level of variability in trade status and
trade intensity of each rm over time. Moreover, it is also of general interest to understand
in more detail whether trade status or intensity are largely time-invariant rm characteristics
- or, instead, if rms tend to switch into and out of export or import markets or if they vary
such intensities frequently.
Table 4 presents a trade-status transition matrix, based on pooling our rm-level data
over the 1995-2005 period. In each year, rms are assigned to one of ve mutually-exclusive
statuses: non-trader, exporter only, importer only, exporter-importer and outside the data
(`out'). The last case concerns rms that enter the data (i.e. that are not in the data in year
t 1 but are in the data in year t - typically new rms) or rms that leave the data (i.e. that
are present in year t   1 but not in year t - typically bankruptcies or mergers). The `total'
column on the right-hand side sums horizontally the dierent outcomes in year t conditional
on a given status in year t   1.
From the analysis of the diagonal elements of Table 4, we nd that a large percentage
of rms, ranging from 57.3% to 79.5% of their t   1 category number stay in the same
9category in year t (the exception, the `out' category, is zero by construction). However, we
also nd that a considerable number of rms switch status, in particular if they are either
exporter-only or importer-only in year t   1. For instance, 19.5% (8.4%) of exporters-only in
t   1 become domestic (exporter-importer) in t. Similarly, 12.3% (9.8%) of importers-only in
t   1 become domestic (exporter-importers) in t. On the other hand, non-trader and export-
importer categories appear to be more `permanent', particularly the former group: less than
2% of non-traders in year t   1 switch to a dierent category (except `out') in year t, while
less than 5% of exporter-importers in t  1 switch to either one of the three main status in t.
These ndings have to be borne in mind when interpreting our wage equation results based
on specications that draw on longitudinal variation in rms' trade status.
As mentioned above, there is evidence of dispersion in trade intensities even within each
type of trader. Figure 3 sheds some additional light on this by presenting a scatterplot of the
joint distribution of export and import shares. (Given the very large size of our data, this
scatterplot is based on a 10% random sample of the entire data.) We nd that, while there
are large numbers of rms along the horizontal (import/sales ratio) or vertical (export/sales
ratio) axes - i.e. rms that either only import or only export -, there is also a considerable
spread across rms, in particular in terms of the latter dimension. A related result is that,
perhaps not surprisingly, only a very small number of rms import large shares of their sales,
for instance of more than 75%.
Following up on this preliminary analysis, which indicates a considerable amount of cross-
sectional variation, Figure 4 presents a scatterplot of the joint distribution of changes in
export and import shares, drawing on the same sample as the one used for Figure 3. We
nd again a considerable amount of variation across rms. Moreover, there is no particular
predominance of a particular direction in the export or import shares, as all quadrants exhibit
similarly large numbers of rm-year observations.
We also extend our analysis of the extent of rm status variation to the worker level
for the same descriptive and identication reasons as above. From the consideration of the
diagonal elements of the top panel of Table 5, we nd that a large number of workers, ranging
from 41.3% to 65.3% of their t   1 category total size stay in the same category in year t
(again, the exception, the `out' category, is zero by construction). However, we also nd that
a considerable number of workers switch status, in particular if they are employed in rms
10that trade in year t 1. For instance, 11% of workers employed in exporters-only in t 1 are
employed in either exporter-importers or domestic rms in year t. Similarly, 7% (11.2%) of
workers employed in importers-only in t   1 are employed in domestic (exporter-importers)
rms in t. On the other hand, employment in domestic and export-importer rms appears to
be more time-invariant, given that less than 3% of those workers in year t   1 switch to any
other category (except `out') in year t.6
In addition, as some of the models that we will estimate in the next two sections draw on
variation within (employer-employee) spells, we also investigate the amount of variability in
trade status for worker-year pairs in which the worker is employed in the same rm in years
t 1 and t. The bottom panel of Table 5 presents this transition matrix. As one may expect,
we nd that disregarding between-rm movers reduces the extent of trade status variability.
Indeed, from the analysis of the diagonal elements of Table 5, we nd that a large number of
workers, ranging from 66.1% to 94.4% of all workers in each t   1 category stay in the same
category in year t. However, even within matches there is a non-ignorable amount of trade
status variation, in particular for workers employed in either exporter-only or importer-only
rms: between 10% and 16% of these workers (in terms of their t   1 status) move into
domestic rms, while 16% move into exporter-importer rms (in t).
Finally, we consider the variation in trade status at the rm level but over a longer
period. In particular, we examine the years 2002-2005 and document the most important
trade status paths, dened as a given combination of trade status over the four years. When
not weighting for rm size, we nd - see top panel of Table 6 - that the most common pattern
corresponds to rms that are non-traders all four years (15,698 rms). However, the second
most common pattern corresponds to rms that are always exporter-importers, although at
a large distance (1,999 rms only). Moreover, the third and fourth most important patterns
are always importer-only (744) and always exporter-only (602). Only when we get to the fth
most common pattern do we observe rms that switch their status: always non-traders that
become exporters in 2005 (289 rms) or exporters than become non-traders in 2003 (217).
A large number of other combinations then follows, including 2752 rms whose combinations
are outside the top-10 patterns listed.
We also consider the diversity of patterns when weighting rms by their employment size -
6Mobility into or out of the `out' category includes workers that remain in the QP data set but are employed
in a non-manufacturing rm. Other cases include retirement, inactivity, unemployment or workers whose
identiers have been coded incorrectly.
11see the bottom panel of Table 6. We nd again that the most important time patterns are those
in which the trade status is unchanged over the four-year period we consider. However, now
the most important specic pattern corresponds to rms that are always exporter-importers
(representing an average of 188k workers), followed by always non-traders (104k). Always
importers (19k) and always exporters (9k) come next, but only after a big gap in terms of the
number of workers involved. The other most important patterns in terms of our top-10 ranking
are rms that switch from importers-only to exporters-importers and non-traders that become
exporters. As in the case of the un-weighted analysis, we nd that `ip-opping' patterns, in
which rms switch back and forth in their trade status, are not empirically important.
Overall, we conclude from this analysis that there is considerable scope for (statistical)
identication of models that rely on variation in rm trade status or even trade intensity.
However, results based on within-spell variation will need to take into account that such
variation is less widespread, with possible eects in terms of the precision of the resulting
estimates.
5 Main results
The main goal of this paper is to assess and compare the eects of exporting and importing
in terms of workers' pay. Our analysis is based on the estimation of wage equations, including
a varying and - in some specications - particularly large set of control variables, including
rm and/or worker xed eects or rm-worker spell xed eects. The identication of the
eects of interest is therefore based on the assumption that, given such large set of controls,
variation across observations in trade status or trade intensity is random.
We begin by estimating our wage equations on rm-level data, given the benchmark set
by the earlier literature; and then move on to worker-level data, in order to take into account
compositional biases that may aect the rm-level analysis.
125.1 Firm-level analysis
Our rst set of results are obtained by estimating dierent versions of the following wage
equation:
yjt = 1(Exporter   only)jt + 2(Importer   only)jt + 3(Exporter   Importer)jt+
W0
jt4 + F0
jt5 + t + j + jt;
(1)
in which yjt is the logarithm of the mean real hourly total wage of rm j in year t. (Exporter 
only)jt, (Importer   only)jt and (Exporter   Importer)jt are the explanatory variables of
interest, dummy variables equal to one if rm j only exports, only imports or both exports
and imports, respectively, in year t. Fjt and Wjt are a vector of rm and (average) worker
control variables, respectively, and t and j are year and rm xed eects, respectively.
Given that most of the literature has considered only the role of exports on wages, we
begin by estimating a version of equation 3 that excludes all trade dummies and redenes
the Exporter dummy as taking value one if the rm exports (regardless of its import status).
Table 7 reports the results, considering four dierent specications, each based on dierent
sets of controls variables. From this analysis, we nd that, either with just year xed eects
(column 1) or when controlling also for (average) worker characteristics (schooling, quadratics
in experience and tenure, gender and hours - column 2), there is a very large and precisely
estimated export premium, as the 1 estimates are .255 and .191, respectively (columns 1
and 2). However, this coecient falls considerably, to .057 when including rm controls (rm
size, foreign ownership, and region and industry dummies) - see column 3 - and to .007 when
adding rm xed eects (column 4).7 These results indicate that a large part of the export
wage premium is explainable by the dierent (time-varying and time-invariant) characteristics
of rms that export.
We now turn to the estimates from equation 3, which we present in Table 8. Consistently
with the evidence from the descriptive statistics, we nd that, when ignoring all control
variables, exporter-importer and importer-only status result in the highest average wage,
with coecients of .368 and .312, respectively. Exporters-only exhibit a coecient of less
than half, .14. The comparison of these results with the same specications from Table 7 -
7Amongst such dierent rm characteristics, the role of foreign ownership has received attention in the
literature, including the case of Portugal (Martins 2004, forthcoming).
13without separating betwee exporters-only and exporter-importers - is interesting. Indeed, the
big fall in the export coecients (from .255 to .140) indicates that much of the large eect
from the rst table comes from the considerable number of exporters that also import and
their high wages.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 include rm controls and, as in Table 7, we nd that the until
then still very large export coecient drop considerably. However, the importer coecient
remains larger than its exporter counterpart (at .017 vs .009), while exporter-importers exhibit
a coecient of .019 (column 4).
As suggested before, a better understanding of the relationship between wages and in-
ternational trade requires an analysis along both the extensive and intensive margins. We
therefore now turn to the estimation of a dierent version of equation 3, in which we replace
the trade status dummies by two continuous variables, X/S and M/S, the export and import
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in which all the variables are dened in the same way as in equation 3 and S denotes the
level of sales (of rm j in year t). The key explanatory variables, (X=S)jt and (M=S)jt are
continuous variables. They vary along the interval [0,1] in the case of the export share and in
the range [0,10] in the case of the import share, even if, as mentioned before, very few rms
import more than their sales.
For comparison purposes, Table 9 presents the results based on a specication that ignores
imports, i.e. in which the only trade-related variable is the share of exports in total sales.
Again we nd a similar pattern to the results in Table 7, as the specications without rm
controls results in large wage premiums, of around .25 log points in the two rst columns.
Moreover, the coecients again drop considerably when rm controls are included, to .031
in the specication with worker and rm controls and to .013 in the specication that also
includes rm xed eects.
Finally, we turn to Table 10 which adds the import share to the wage equation. We nd
that, as before, the export coecient drops (about .05 log points in this case) when a control
for imports is added. More importantly, the results indicate that the eect of the import
share is much larger than that of the export share, at .436 (without controls) and .284 (with
14worker controls), compared with the corresponding export-share coecients of .198 and .205,
respectively. In addition, again as in the specication based on trade status (Table 8), the
main coecients become very small in the most comprehensive model of column 4, which also
includes both rm controls and rm xed eects.
We conclude from our rm-level analysis that the exporter and importer premiums fall to
less than .02 when rm controls (including rm xed eects) are taken into account. On the
other hand, we nd that if not considering the most stringent specications - in particular
when not controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity - the importer premium is generally
much larger than its exporter counterpart.
5.2 Worker-level analysis
After establishing the importance of exports and imports in terms of a rm-level analysis,
we now take our estimations to the worker level. This allows us to address more directly
any compositional biases that may explain the rm-level results. For instance, when rms
begin importing or exporting they may also adjust their hiring policies towards more skilled
employees. Although we already control for several human capital and other variables, such
dierences in personnel quality over time may still be obscured in the data in such a way that
a premium is estimated even if such wage dierential can actually be accounted for by worker
quality dierences. By following each worker over time, we minimise such potential bias.
Specically, in this subsection we estimate dierent versions of the following wage equation:
yijt = 1(Exporter   only)ijt + 2(Importer   only)ijt + 3(Exporter   Importer)ijt+
W0
ijt4 + F0
j(i;t);t5 + t + i + j + ijt;
(3)
in which yijt is logarithm of the real hourly total wage of worker i in rm j in year t,
(Exporter   only)ijt, (Importer   only)ijt and (Exporter   Importer)ijt are the explana-
tory variables of interest, dummy variables equal to one if worker i is employed in year t in a
rm j that exports only, imports only or exports and imports, respectively. Wijt and Fj(i;t);t
are a vector of worker and rm control variables, respectively, and t, j and i are time, rm
and worker xed eects, respectively.
In order to fully compare our ndings with those from the rm-level analysis, Table 11
15presents results from a specication that considers only the export status (a dummy equal to
one if the rm exports, regardless of its import status). Consistently with Table 7, we nd
again, in columns 1 and 2, that workers employed by rms that export are paid considerable
premiums, of between .234 and .151 log points, in specications either without controls or
with worker controls only. However, again as before, the inclusion of rm controls reduces
signicantly the estimates, generally to point estimates of less than .01, even if in some
specications these are signicant.
Two specications are entirely new (when compared to the rm-level results) and deserve
special attention. First, the specication in column 6 is based on the joint estimation of
worker and rm xed eects. As it is well-known in this literature (Abowd et al. 1999), such
estimation requires mobility of workers between rms in order to disentangle the two types
of eects and computational power to handle the large data sets in which such mobility is
present in a meaningful way, such as the one used in this paper. We address this estimation
matter by drawing on the algorithm put forward by Guimaraes & Portugal (2009).8
Second, the specication in column 7 is also important as it relies on spell (worker-rm
match) xed eects. This means that in this case the only source of variation used for the
purpose of the estimation of the export (and, later, the import) variables is the variation
within such matches. However, as we have concluded before, when discussing the worker-
level transition matrix for workers that stay in the same rm - second part of Table 5 -,
this variability is somewhat limited when compared to the case of the entire manufacturing
population.
Having highlighted these important identication and estimation issues, we now turn to
Table 12, which includes both export, import and export-import trade status. Columns 1
and 2, which exclude rm controls, are again consistent with the rm-level analysis in that
the import coecient proves to be much larger than its export counterpart (.278 vs .054 in
column 1, .151 vs .059 in column 2). Moreover, as before, the exporter-importer coecient is
larger than both the exporter-only and importer-only coecients (.333 and .209 in columns
1 and 2, respectively).
When considering the dierent specications with rm controls, we nd that, once again,
the point estimates fall considerably, in many cases dropping to less than .02. However, as
8See Carneiro et al. (2009) for an application, also based on the QP data set. The R
2 statistic is not strictly
comparable with those of the other specications.
16before, the import variable is more resilient to the dierent controls. Column 6, based on the
specication with rm and worker xed eects, is particularly interesting in this respect, as
all trade coecients are signicant, even at the 1% level.
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following a similar notation as in the previous equations.
First we consider Table 13, which examines only the share of exports in total sales in
isolation. Here we nd, as in the rm-level analysis, that before controlling for rm charac-
teristics, there is a statistically signicant and positive relationship between export intensity
and sales but this relationship turns much weaker (and, in some cases, insignicant) when
rm-level controls are added. However, contrary to the rm-level results, our worker-level
analysis documents a statistically signicant and positive relationship when rm xed eects
are added: for instance, in column 6, when both rm and worker xed eects are considered,
we nd a coecient of .026, signicant at the 1% level. This coecient remains positive and
at a similarly small magnitude (.018) when spell xed eects are considered instead; however,
the coecient is no longer signicant.
Having established the importance of exports following previous research based on similar
specications (Schank et al. 2007, Munch & Skaksen 2008), we now turn to a novel specication
that considers the roles of both export and import intensities. Table 14 presents these results.
We nd that, when not controlling for rm characteristics, the share of imports plays a much
important role on wages that its export equivalent. For instance, column 2 (which includes
only workers controls), indicates that the import share coecient is .238, compared to only
.056 for the case of exports (both signicant at the 1% level).
More importantly, we also nd that in many of the remaining specications, the point
estimate of the imports variable is larger and/or more signicant than its export counterpart.
For instance, when controlling for worker xed eects, the imports share coecient is .012 and
signicant at the 5% level, while the export share estimate is -.006 and insignicant. However,
the point estimates and their precision turn out to be very similar when controlling for both
worker and rm xed eects. In the end, imports appear to be a determinant of wages of a
17similar importance than exports.
6 Extensions
6.1 Dierences by products
In order to test further the robustness of our main resuls, this section decomposes each
rm's exports and imports in terms of the technological level of the products transacted.
This analysis is also relevant given our theoretical motivation, in which we underlined the
role of productivity eects from exports and/or imports in terms of the creation of wage
premiums. Indeed, products of dierent technological level may generate dierent productivity
- and therefore wage - eects. Another related aspect was the role of eciency wages in the
improvement of product quality.
Specically, in this section we divide all traded products into four categories, low, medium-
low, medium-high and high technology, following an OECD sectoral classication. Table 15
presents the distribution of exports and imports (in terms of their total value) across product
types. We also include detailed information of the products in each category. This table
indicates a balanced distribution of exports and imports across the four product categories,
except for a larger share of transactions at lower-technology goods, particularly in terms of
exports, which account for 43.9% of all exported goods.
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the relationship between export and import shares of products
of dierent technological levels and their rms' unconditional wages. An eyeball examination
of these gures suggests that wages increase particularly with medium- and high-tech export
intensities and import intensities of all technological levels. However, in some cases, the
positive relationship between trade intensities and wages may be driven by a relatively small
number of rms.
We then turn to the wage equation estimates. These results are based on the specication
that considers the intensive margins of either exports only or both exports and imports,
now broken down in four types of products (following the structure of equation 4). Table 16
presents the results that consider the role of exports (in total sales by product type) only, using
rm-level data. The rst column, which ignores all control variables, indicates considerable
dierences across product types. For instance, while low-tech exports translate into a wage
increase of only .09, high-tech exports correspond to a wage increase of .886. More generally,
18there is a positive relationship between the wage premium and the technological level of the
product. However, when one takes into account the possible correlations of dierent rm
characteristics and the average level of technological sophistication of the product exported,
one nds that the wage gradient attens considerably. On the other hand, these is still some
evidence of greater wage eects from medium- and high-tech goods even in the specication
with rm xed eects (column 4).
A similar set of results is found when we take into account both the breakdown of exports
and imports in terms of their technological levels - Table 17. However, a major dierence
between exports and imports is that the relationship of the latter with wages seem to hump-
shaped, as the highest eect arises with medium-high tech products.
Finally, we replicate the analysis above considering worker-level data. Table 18 presents
the results based on the analysis of the share of exports in total sales by product type. As
before, when considering the rm-level analysis of this same specication, we nd a steep
increase in wage premiums with the technological level of the product exported, at least
between the rst three levels. Moreover, the addition of more control variables attens the
relationship considerably. However, even when controlling for both worker and rm xed
eects, we nd a clear upward pattern between the wage premiums and the technological
level of exports (.011 for low-tech, .035 for medium-low, .037 for medium-high, and .057 for
high-tech products, all statistically signicant at the 1% level). Furthermore, even in the
most demanding specication, based on spell xed eects, the exports of highest-technology
products is signicantly related to higher wages, with a point estimate of .071.
This result proves to be robust to the inclusion of similar controls for the imports of each
worker's rm. Table 19 reports a very similar point estimate, of .072, in the same spell xed
eects specication. However, while we nd a similar wage gradient with the technological
level of imports in the specications without control variables, ultimately the wage premium
is highest or only signicant for imports of intermediate technological level (medium-low and
medium-high products in the specication with worker and rm xed eects).
6.2 Robustness tests
We have also tested the robustness of our results by replicating our analysis (rm- and worker-
levels, considering aggregate products or products of dierent technological level) under dif-
19ferent specications and sample denitions. In the rst test, we included sales in the list of
rm control variables. The motivation is that it is well known that rent sharing can be an im-
portant component of wage determination. We found from this analysis (results not reported
but available upon request) that imports become even more important when controlling for
sales. This result can be seen as consistent with the eect of threat points.
In another set of tests, we redid our regressions including a control for equity, a proxy
for capital available in our data. We found that all our results are robust to the inclusion of
this variable. This nding suggests that the roles of exports and imports upon wages are not
simply capturing dierences across rms in terms of their capital intensity.
We also considered dierent subsets of our original data, in order to create more compara-
ble group of rms, less subject to biases driven by dierences in their common support: only
rms with more than 50 employees, only rms with total sales higher than 100.000 euros, only
workers with tenure greater than ve years, or only Portuguese rms. The last data subset is
of particular importance, as it addresses the potential criticism that foreign rms reports of
their international trade may be subject to transfer pricing, which could bias the eects from
trade levels on wages that we document. However, we nd in all subsets the same qualitative
results as in our benchmark ndings.
Finally, we also considered dierent wage measures, in particular only base pay, thus
disregarding the other components which we include in our baseline specications - overtime
pay (and overtime hours), tenure-related pay and bonuses. Once again our benchmark results
proved robust.
7 Conclusions
Recent contributions to the trade-and-wages literature have focused exclusively on the role of
exports. For several reasons, we see this focus on exports to the detriment of imports as an
important shortcoming in the understanding of the eects of international trade upon labour
markets. Our paper addresses this gap by drawing on unique data from Portugal, merging
two dierent matched panel data sets, and providing the rst comparative analysis of the
roles of exports and imports on wages.
Our results indicate that imports tend to be a determinant of wages at least as important
as exports. This nding is robust across a large range of econometric specications and ap-
20plies at both the rm- and worker-levels. However, the wage premiums can exhibit a small
economic magnitude, although typically only in the most demanding econometric specica-
tions (spell xed eects). Indeed, in our analysis, such specication controls not only for
all time-invariant heterogeneity but also for a considerable amount of time-varying rm and
worker heterogeneity. As it is therefore quite unlikely that such stringent estimates are picking
up worker quality dierences across rms of dierent trading status, we interpret our results
(small but non zero estimates) as indicating that non-competitive labour-market mechanisms
are present amongst both importers and exporters.
In terms of our theoretical discussion, the importance of imports in terms of wages can be
reconciled with dierent views, including productivity eects from imports as in the case of
exports. The interpretation based on the productivity eect of trade is also consistent with
our current research (Martins & Opromolla 2009), which uses a similar data set to the one
presented here to examine the relationship between exports and imports in terms of labour
productivity. Our preliminary results indicate that productivity increases systematically when
rms engage in either exporting and importing.
Moreover, we also nd evidence against the practice so far common in the literature of
treating exports as a composite good. In fact, our results indicate that there are important
dierences in the relationship between exports - and also between imports - and wages across
product types. In particular, rms that increase their exports of high-technology products
or that increase their imports of intermediate-technology products tend to increase their pay
the most. This dierence between importers and exporters can tentatively be explained
taking into account that the economy under study here, Portugal, although developed, is
typically below the international technological frontier in several sectors. Therefore, imports
of products of an intermediate technological level may be those more likely to improve rms'
performance, as high-tech products may hit absorption capacity constraints. On the other
hand, and more generally, high-tech exports will tend to be more dierentiated and subject to
lower price-demand elasticities in destination markets, leading to rents that can subsequently
be shared with employees. High-tech exports (medium-tech imports) may also result from
eciency-wage policies adopted by exporters (importers) keen to upgrade the technological
level of their products.
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Appendix: Data
A. INE trade data
The INE trade data includes all export and import transactions by rms that are located in
Portugal, on a monthly basis. These data are derived from customs returns forms in the case
of extra-EU trade and from a special form supplied to the Portuguese statistics agency, INE -
Instituto Nacional de Estat stica (Intrastat) in the case of intra-EU trade. Firms are required
to provide information on their trade transactions if the volume of exports or imports in the
previous year or two years before was higher than 60,000 euros and 85,000 euros respectively.
Overall, the data amount to the ocial total exports and imports of Portugal.
24Each transaction record includes the rms tax identication, an eight digit Combined
Nomenclature product code, the value of the transaction, the quantity of transacted goods
(expressed in kilograms), the destination/origin country, the type of transport, the relevant
international commercial term (FOB, CIF, etc) and a variable indicating the type of trans-
action (transfer of ownership after payment, return of a product, etc). Also see Amador &
Opromolla (2008) for more information about the data and several descriptive statistics.
B. QP labour data
Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longitudinal dataset matching rms and workers based in Por-
tugal. The data are made available by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, drawing
on a compulsory annual census of all rms in Portugal that employ at least one worker. The
data also cover individual information on all personnel working for each rm in a reference
month (October), except for 2001.
The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the workplace - as
required by law - imply a high degree of coverage and reliability. See, amongst other papers,
Cabral & Mata (2003) and Martins (2009) for recent applications based on the QP data. Our
sample includes all manufacturing rms based in Continental Portugal and their full-time
employees, age between 16 and 65, working a minimum of 25 and a maximum of 80 total
hours per week.
The variables available in the data set include the rm's location, industry, total employ-
ment, sales, ownership structure (foreign, domestic private and domestic public), and legal
setting. At the worker's level, the data set includes information on gender, age, occupation,
schooling, hiring date, earnings (ve dierent variables), duration of work (three dierent
variables), as well as information abot collective bargaining.
The mean wage is computed adding base and overtime wages plus tenure- and performance-
related compensation and dividing by the number of regular and overtime hours worked in
the reference month. Sales, exports and imports are expressed in 2004 billion euros. Gross
wages are deated by the Consumers Price Index (made available by INE) to 2004 euros.
We classify rms are foreign-owned if they have a foreign participation in their equity of
at least 50%. 78% of the rms in our sample with a non-zero foreign ownership meet this
threshold.
Personnel on short-term leave (such as sickness, maternity, strike or holidays) are included,
whereas personnel on long-term leave (such as military service) are not reported. Civil ser-
vants, the self-employed and domestic service are not covered, and the coverage of agriculture
is low given its low share of wage-earners.
C. HS and OECD Nomenclatures
The Combined Nomenclature system is comprised of the Harmonized System (HS) nomencla-
ture with further European Community subdivisions. The HS is run by the World Customs
Organisation (WCO). This classication of commodities is used by most trading nations and
in international trade negotiations. The rst six digits of the Combined Nomenclature sys-
tem approximately coincide with the HS classication. While the Combined Nomenclature
system is changed almost every year, the HS, created in 1988, was updated on January 1st
1996, January 1st 2002 and January 1st 2007.
The OECD nomenclature (Loschky 2008) takes into account both the level of technology
specic to the sector (measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added) and the
technology embodied in purchases of intermediate and capital goods. We then converted this
sectoral classication into a product classication.
25When creating the export and import shares, we ignore both rm-years' export shares in
which that ratio is greater than one and rm-years' import shares in which that ratio is greater
than 10. Each one of these cases correspond to a very small percentage of our observations.
26Figures
Figure 1: Export shares and wages
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of
all 1995-2005 pooled rm-level data.
27Figure 2: Import shares and wages
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of
all 1995-2005 pooled rm-level data.
28Figure 3: X and M shares in terms of sales
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of
all 1995-2005 pooled rm-level data.
29Figure 4: Changes in X and M shares in terms of sales
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of
all 1995-2005 pooled rm-level data.
30Figure 5: Export shares by product type and wages
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of
all 1995-2005 pooled rm-level data.
31Figure 6: Import shares by product type and wages
Note: Source: Authors calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Representative 10% sample of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 2: Firm-level Descriptive statistics, pooled 1995-2005
mean median standard dev. N
Non-Trading Firms
Sales 380.14 144.64 261.90 240843
Workers 9.51 5.00 17.83 289382
Schooling 6.10 6.00 2.10 285947
Experience 22.51 21.71 9.09 285928
Tenure 5.31 4.00 5.22 286377
Female 0.36 0.20 0.39 289382
Hourly Wage 3.12 2.78 1.49 289382
Exporters-only
Sales 1271.05 639.03 5076.36 18381
Workers 25.13 17.00 30.20 22256
Schooling 6.28 5.96 1.95 22136
Experience 23.51 23.05 7.40 22136
Tenure 6.82 5.47 5.52 22145
Female 0.47 0.46 0.33 22256
Hourly Wage 3.61 3.21 1.98 22256
X/S 0.30 0.13 0.34 18381
Importers-only
Sales 3209.56 1222.17 1070 19646
Workers 33.84 19.00 59.08 22158
Schooling 7.12 6.55 2.35 22006
Experience 22.81 22.55 6.93 22006
Tenure 7.08 5.83 5.40 22076
Female 0.37 0.29 0.31 22158
Hourly Wage 4.43 3.77 3.45 22158
M/S 0.24 0.16 0.37 19600
Exporters-Importers
Sales 12700 3439.52 7730 28517
Workers 113.11 56.00 228.76 33590
Schooling 6.94 6.52 1.91 33459
Experience 23.37 23.18 5.97 33459
Tenure 8.75 7.60 5.61 33534
Female 0.44 0.42 0.29 33590
Hourly Wage 4.67 4.03 3.03 33590
X/S 0.37 0.28 0.34 28517
M/S 0.22 0.16 0.30 28499
Notes: See the data appendix for variable denitions.
35Table 3: Worker-level Descriptive statistics, pooled 1995-2005
mean median standard dev. N
Non-Trading Firms
Sales 2191.92 431.75 1060 1677921
Workers 44.64 17.00 125.94 1959654
Schooling 6.04 6.00 2.75 1929763
Experience 23.21 21.00 12.23 1929255
Tenure 6.62 4.00 7.48 1934240
Female 0.42 0.00 0.49 1959654
Hourly Wage 3.47 2.83 2.99 1959654
Exporters-only
Sales 3045.95 1370.30 1270 342731
Workers 61.49 39.00 72.09 419440
Schooling 5.97 6.00 2.86 414429
Experience 23.93 22.00 12.26 414317
Tenure 8.14 6.00 8.33 415298
Female 0.51 1.00 0.50 419440
Hourly Wage 3.66 2.95 3.63 419440
X/S 0.34 0.17 0.36 342731
Importers-only
Sales 13300 3335.86 3440 537925
Workers 140.21 61.00 281.90 593651
Schooling 6.89 6.00 3.54 586134
Experience 23.94 23.00 12.27 585986
Tenure 8.98 6.00 8.83 589432
Female 0.37 0.00 0.48 593651
Hourly Wage 5.01 3.63 9.15 593651
M/S 0.19 0.11 0.31 536211
Exporters-Importers
Sales 87200 14400 37300 2528473
Workers 552.53 228.00 943.04 3023376
Schooling 6.96 6.00 3.55 3000042
Experience 24.05 23.00 12.23 2999474
Tenure 10.92 8.00 9.78 3012270
Female 0.45 0.00 0.50 3023376
Hourly Wage 5.26 3.88 8.16 3023376
X/S 0.44 0.40 0.34 2528473
M/S 0.24 0.19 0.26 2526684
Notes: See the data appendix for variable denitions.
36Table 4: Trade Status Transition Matrix, Firms, Average 1995-2005
Year t
Year t   1 Non-Trader Exporter Only Importer Only Exporter-Importer Out Total
Non-Trader 77.74 1.77 1.03 0.21 19.25 100
(176,993) (4,021) (2,348) (486) (43,817) (227,665)
Exporter Only 19.49 57.31 1.13 8.4 13.67 100
(3,405) (10,013) (198) (1,467) (2,388) (17,471)
Importer Only 12.29 1.03 65.73 9.78 11.17 100
(2,176) (182) (11,634) (1,731) (1,978) (17,701)
Exporter-Importer 1.46 4.85 5.64 79.48 8.58 100
(385) (1,282) (1,492) (21,027) (2,270) (26,456)
Out 87.32 4.3 4.02 4.36 0 100
(50,047) (2,465) (2,302) (2,498) (0) (57,312)
37Table 5: Trade Status Transition Matrix, Workers, Average 1995-2005
All workers
Year t
Year t   1 Domestic Exporter Only Importer Only Exporter-Importer Out Total
Domestic 55.92 2.48 2.17 1.56 37.86 100
(871,629) (38,697) (33,760) (24,357) (590,149) (1,558,592)
Exporter Only 10.8 41.3 1.30 10.60 36.04 100
(36,662) (140,113) (4,402) (35,979) (122,384) (339,540)
Importer Only 6.96 0.82 48.89 11.18 32.16 100
(33,469) (3,926) (235,198) (53,782) (154,713) (481,088)
Exporter-Importer 0.87 1.43 2.07 65.34 30.29 100
(21,325) (35,022) (50,506) (1,596,507) (740,069) (2,443,429)
Out 37.92 7.33 9.59 45.16 0 100
(602,125) (116,450) (152,280) (717,214) (0) (1,588,069)
Only workers staying in the same rm
Year t
Year t   1 Domestic Exporter Only Importer Only Exporter-Importer Total
Domestic 91.39 3.91 3.34 1.36 100
(848,874) (36,356) (31,029) (12,635) (928,894)
Exporter Only 16.17 66.06 1.91 15.86 100
(33,902) (138,536) (4.002) (33,266) (209,706)
Importer Only 9.69 1.12 73.41 15.78 100
(30,839) (3,572) (233,507) (50,183) (318,101)
Exporter-Importer 0.83 1.97 2.80 94.40 100
(13,762) (32,730) (46,520) (1,567,523) (1,660,535)
38Table 6: Firms' Trade Status Paths, 2002-05
Panel A
2002 2003 2004 2005 Number of Firms
NT NT NT NT 15698
XM XM XM XM 1999
M M M M 744
X X X X 602
NT NT NT X 289
X NT NT NT 217
NT NT X X 209
NT X NT NT 183
NT NT X NT 175
M M NT NT 110
(Others...) 2752
Panel B
2002 2003 2004 2005 Avg. Number of Workers
XM XM XM XM 188459.5
NT NT NT NT 104127
M M M M 18748.5
X X X X 9207
M XM XM XM 3712.5
M M XM XM 3162.5
NT NT NT X 2938.3
M M M XM 2682.8
NT NT X X 2366.5
X NT NT NT 2160.8
(Others...) 59724
Notes: Actual paths, by trade status, for all rms that are active
throughout the 2002-2005 period. NT stands for "non-trader", X stands
for "exporter only", M stands for "importer only" and XM stands for
"exporter-importer". The column "Avg. Number of Workers" shows the
total number of workers employed, on average, by the rms following each
path.
39Table 7: Firm-level analysis - Discrete X status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter .255 .191 .057 .007
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Schooling .066 .070 .029
(.0007) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .033 .025 .017
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.048 -.029 -.019
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .008 .003 .005
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.009 .0005 -.010
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.185 -.260 -.156
(.002) (.003) (.005)
Log hours -.634 -.714 -.741
(.019) (.022) (.015)
Log rm size .072 .012
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 367386 360449 258190 258190
R2 .116 .388 .447 .833
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
40Table 8: Firm-level analysis - Discrete X, M and XM status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exporter only .140 .113 .048 .009
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Importer only .312 .214 .118 .017
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Exporter-Importer .368 .286 .114 .019
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.003)
Schooling .060 .066 .029
(.0007) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .030 .024 .017
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.043 -.029 -.019
(.0008) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .006 .003 .005
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.003 .002 -.010
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.185 -.257 -.156
(.002) (.003) (.005)
Log hours -.665 -.720 -.741
(.018) (.022) (.015)
Log rm size .061 .011
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 367386 360449 258190 258190
R2 .176 .416 .455 .833
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
41Table 9: Firm-level analysis - X as percentage of sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
X/S .268 .246 .031 .013
(.008) (.005) (.005) (.007)
Schooling .070 .070 .028
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .036 .025 .017
(.0005) (.0006) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.054 -.029 -.019
(.0009) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .011 .004 .006
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.014 -.001 -.011
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.185 -.261 -.152
(.002) (.003) (.006)
Log hours -.623 -.713 -.748
(.021) (.023) (.016)
Log rm size .082 .020
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 307387 302101 222869 222869
R2 .069 .374 .451 .84
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
42Table 10: Firm-level analysis - X and M as percentage of sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
X/S .198 .205 .023 .012
(.008) (.006) (.006) (.007)
M/S .436 .284 .129 .003
(.026) (.018) (.010) (.005)
Schooling .067 .068 .028
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .035 .024 .017
(.0005) (.0006) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.051 -.029 -.019
(.0009) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .010 .004 .006
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.012 -.0009 -.011
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.185 -.260 -.152
(.002) (.003) (.006)
Log hours -.640 -.717 -.747
(.020) (.023) (.016)
Log rm size .079 .020
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 307323 302039 222807 222807
R2 .105 .389 .454 .84
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
43Table 11: Worker-level analysis - Discrete X status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exporter .234 .151 .023 .002 .003 .005 .002
(.012) (.007) (.006) (.003) (.003) (.0004) (.003)
Schooling .095 .078 .033 .069 .006 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0005) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .043 .028 .015 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0006) (.0002) (.0003) (.0009)
(Experience2)=100 -.037 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.027
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .012 .011 .004 .011 .004 .003
(.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00007) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.017 -.018 -.013 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.294 -.262 -.234
(.005) (.004) (.003)
Log hours -.203 -.337 -.180 -.283 -.164 -.177
(.050) (.030) (.026) (.023) (.002) (.028)
Log rm size .056 .043 .025 .073 .065
(.003) (.002) (.004) (.0004) (.006)
No. establishments -.002 -.0002 .001 .00006 1.00e-05
(.0006) (.0005) (.0007) (.00007) (.0009)
Foreign .081 .034 .019 .028 .015
(.012) (.007) (.008) (.0007) (.009)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5996121 5886189 5521063 5521063 5521063 5521063 5521063
R2 .075 .483 .568 .909 .678 .176 .925
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the
worker level). Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
44Table 12: Worker-level analysis - Discrete X, M and XM status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exporter only .054 .059 .018 .006 .007 .007 .006
(.007) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.0006) (.003)
Importer only .278 .151 .068 .011 .012 .010 .007
(.016) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.003) (.0006) (.004)
Exporter-Importer .333 .209 .058 .007 .010 .011 .006
(.013) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.0006) (.004)
Schooling .092 .077 .033 .069 .006 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0005) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .043 .028 .015 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0006) (.0002) (.0003) (.0009)
(Experience2)=100 -.036 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.027
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .011 .010 .004 .011 .004 .003
(.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00007) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.016 -.018 -.013 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.291 -.261 -.234
(.004) (.004) (.003)
Log hours -.229 -.335 -.180 -.283 -.164 -.177
(.048) (.030) (.026) (.023) (.002) (.028)
Log rm size .050 .042 .024 .072 .065
(.003) (.002) (.004) (.0004) (.006)
No. establishments -.001 -.0002 .001 .00008 .00002
(.0006) (.0005) (.0007) (.00007) (.0009)
Foreign .080 .034 .019 .028 .015
(.012) (.007) (.008) (.0007) (.009)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5996121 5886189 5521063 5521063 5521063 5521063 5521063
R2 .115 .494 .569 .909 .678 .176 .925
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the
worker level). Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
45Table 13: Worker-level analysis - X as percentage of sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X/S .088 .100 -.019 .008 .019 .022 .019
(.023) (.014) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.0009) (.013)
Schooling .098 .077 .034 .070 .011 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .044 .028 .021 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0007) (.0002) (.0003) (.001)
(Experience2)=100 -.037 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.028
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .014 .011 .004 .011 .004 .004
(.0006) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00008) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.020 -.018 -.012 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.295 -.261 -.236
(.005) (.004) (.002)
Log hours -.195 -.356 -.208 -.309 -.195 -.206
(.053) (.031) (.024) (.022) (.002) (.027)
Log rm size .065 .046 .027 .076 .068
(.003) (.002) (.005) (.0005) (.007)
No. establishments -.002 -.0003 .001 -.00006 -.0002
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.00008) (.0008)
Foreign .096 .032 .020 .024 .009
(.012) (.008) (.008) (.0008) (.010)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5087050 4996201 4713266 4713266 4713266 4713266 4713266
R2 .028 .467 .569 .913 .678 .18 .927
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the
worker level). Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
46Table 14: Worker-level analysis - X and M as percentage of sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X/S .005 .056 -.022 .006 .017 .020 .017
(.024) (.014) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.0009) (.013)
M/S .434 .238 .053 .012 .005 .008 .003
(.035) (.021) (.010) (.005) (.005) (.0007) (.006)
Schooling .095 .077 .034 .070 .011 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .043 .028 .021 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0007) (.0002) (.0003) (.001)
(Experience2)=100 -.037 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.028
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .014 .011 .004 .011 .004 .004
(.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00008) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.019 -.018 -.012 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.292 -.261 -.236
(.004) (.004) (.002)
Log hours -.239 -.357 -.208 -.308 -.195 -.206
(.050) (.030) (.024) (.022) (.002) (.027)
Log rm size .064 .046 .027 .076 .068
(.003) (.002) (.005) (.0005) (.007)
No. establishments -.002 -.0003 .001 -.00005 -.0002
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.00008) (.0008)
Foreign .090 .031 .020 .023 .009
(.012) (.008) (.008) (.0008) (.010)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5083547 4992754 4709819 4709819 4709819 4709819 4709819
R2 .066 .478 .569 .912 .678 .18 .927
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48Table 16: Firm-level analysis - X by product type (% of sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
XLowTech=S .090 .161 -.013 .002
(.008) (.006) (.006) (.008)
XMedLowTech=S .429 .301 .061 .028
(.017) (.012) (.011) (.014)
XMedHighTech=S .780 .523 .116 .014
(.037) (.027) (.023) (.024)
XHighTech=S .886 .568 .261 .044
(.028) (.021) (.022) (.025)
Schooling .069 .069 .028
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .036 .024 .017
(.0005) (.0006) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.053 -.029 -.019
(.0009) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .011 .004 .006
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.015 -.001 -.011
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.179 -.256 -.152
(.002) (.003) (.006)
Log hours -.631 -.716 -.748
(.021) (.023) (.016)
Log rm size .081 .020
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 307387 302101 222869 222869
R2 .089 .38 .453 .84
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
49Table 17: Firm-level analysis - X and M by product type (% of sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
XLowTech=S .054 .140 -.010 .0008
(.008) (.006) (.006) (.008)
XMedLowTech=S .351 .255 .047 .028
(.017) (.012) (.011) (.013)
XMedHighTech=S .502 .347 .046 .013
(.041) (.029) (.024) (.024)
XHighTech=S .784 .513 .245 .044
(.030) (.022) (.023) (.025)
MLowTech=S .244 .162 .033 .007
(.034) (.024) (.011) (.006)
MMedLowTech=S .455 .295 .151 .011
(.055) (.037) (.021) (.009)
MMedHighTech=S .653 .450 .241 -.006
(.072) (.045) (.027) (.009)
MHighTech=S .452 .300 .162 -.003
(.059) (.039) (.023) (.012)
Schooling .065 .067 .028
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
Experience .034 .024 .017
(.0005) (.0006) (.0006)
(Experience2)=100 -.051 -.029 -.019
(.0009) (.001) (.001)
Tenure .010 .004 .006
(.0004) (.0005) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.013 -.001 -.011
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Female share -.179 -.253 -.152
(.002) (.003) (.006)
Log hours -.649 -.722 -.747
(.020) (.023) (.016)
Log rm size .078 .020
(.001) (.003)




Worker controls x x x
Firm controls x x
Firm xed eects x
Obs. 307323 302039 222807 222807
R2 .125 .395 .457 .84
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level. Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
50Table 18: Worker-level analysis - X by product type (% of sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
XLowTech=S -.118 -.004 .0006 -.002 .019 .011 .013
(.028) (.016) (.011) (.007) (.010) (.001) (.012)
XMedLowTech=S .244 .180 -.046 .020 .018 .035 .019
(.034) (.022) (.019) (.011) (.013) (.002) (.015)
XMedHighTech=S .450 .280 -.070 .012 -.003 .037 .005
(.063) (.029) (.030) (.031) (.034) (.002) (.053)
XHighTech=S .475 .281 -.026 .044 .055 .057 .071
(.031) (.033) (.036) (.019) (.024) (.002) (.029)
Schooling .095 .077 .034 .070 .011 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .043 .028 .021 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0007) (.0002) (.0003) (.001)
(Experience2)=100 -.038 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.028
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .015 .010 .004 .011 .004 .004
(.0006) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00008) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.020 -.018 -.012 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.002) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.284 -.261 -.236
(.005) (.004) (.002)
Log hours -.223 -.355 -.208 -.309 -.195 -.206
(.051) (.030) (.024) (.022) (.002) (.027)
Log rm size .066 .046 .027 .076 .068
(.003) (.002) (.005) (.0005) (.007)
No. establishments -.002 -.0003 .001 -.00004 -.0002
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.00008) (.0008)
Foreign .099 .030 .019 .022 .008
(.012) (.008) (.008) (.0008) (.010)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5087050 4996201 4713266 4713266 4713266 4713266 4713266
R2 .065 .476 .57 .913 .678 .18 .927
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the
worker level). Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
51Table 19: Worker-level analysis - X and M by product type (% of sales)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
XLowTech=S -.123 -.012 .002 -.004 .017 .009 .011
(.029) (.017) (.011) (.007) (.010) (.001) (.012)
XMedLowTech=S .140 .130 -.057 .015 .014 .030 .015
(.034) (.022) (.019) (.011) (.013) (.002) (.015)
XMedHighTech=S .222 .163 -.079 .009 -.005 .033 .003
(.073) (.037) (.030) (.031) (.034) (.002) (.053)
XHighTech=S .262 .171 -.036 .043 .055 .056 .072
(.040) (.026) (.036) (.019) (.024) (.002) (.029)
MLowTech=S .119 .092 .013 .007 .007 .001 -.0008
(.033) (.023) (.015) (.007) (.008) (.001) (.007)
MMedLowTech=S .542 .270 .109 .028 .020 .026 .021
(.084) (.043) (.023) (.009) (.010) (.002) (.013)
MMedHighTech=S .496 .277 .071 .018 -.003 .019 .008
(.074) (.048) (.027) (.017) (.013) (.001) (.017)
MHighTech=S .651 .361 .085 -.002 -.004 -.004 -.013
(.097) (.056) (.030) (.012) (.009) (.002) (.012)
Schooling .093 .077 .034 .070 .012 .031
(.001) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0003) (.0007)
Experience .032 .030 .043 .028 .021 .041
(.0005) (.0003) (.0007) (.0002) (.0003) (.001)
(Experience2)=100 -.037 -.036 -.032 -.033 -.030 -.028
(.0007) (.0005) (.001) (.0004) (.0002) (.001)
Tenure .014 .010 .004 .011 .004 .004
(.0005) (.0004) (.0004) (.0003) (.00008) (.0006)
(Tenure2)=100 -.020 -.018 -.012 -.019 -.011 -.012
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.0009) (.0002) (.002)
Female -.280 -.260 -.236
(.004) (.004) (.002)
Log hours -.264 -.359 -.208 -.308 -.195 -.206
(.048) (.030) (.024) (.022) (.002) (.027)
Log rm size .064 .046 .027 .076 .068
(.003) (.002) (.005) (.0005) (.007)
No. establishments -.002 -.0003 .001 -.00004 -.0002
(.0006) (.0006) (.0007) (.00008) (.0008)
Foreign .093 .030 .019 .022 .008
(.012) (.008) (.008) (.0008) (.010)
Worker controls x x x x x x
Firm controls x x x x x
Worker xed eects x x
Firm xed eects x x
Spell xed eects x
Obs. 5083547 4992754 4709819 4709819 4709819 4709819 4709819
R2 .101 .487 .57 .913 .678 .18 .927
Notes: Source: Author's calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal and INE trade data. Robust standard
errors, allowing for clustering at the rm level (except in specication 4, which allow for clustering at the
worker level). Signicance levels: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
52